Regime agevolato riscatto laurea

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I tempi dei rimborsi Irpef modello dal subiranno un ritardo di due mesi rispetto a quanto avvenuto finora. Ritorno a scuola, Newsweek, Stati Uniti, in Internazionale, n. For a long time, the authoritarian bargain model explained the dynamics in the region and its resilience to change. They imple- ment selected economic and social policies through which they chan- nel benefits to their constituencies. Other policies take the form of recurrent flows of benefits granted to the whole population universal consumption subsidies and free public health and education or to specific segments welfare programs, trade protection, guaranteed lifetime jobs to civil servants, cheap credits to industries and subsidies for farmers.

The usual disclaimer applies. Even with structural adjustment programs and a number of market reforms, the regimes managed the contradiction between market transformation and persistent authoritarianism.

Whenever budget constraints come in- to sight, the regimes make careful trade-offs to preserve their resili- ence. Austerity measures were targeted to specific segments, generally the weakest economically and the less vocal. In the meantime, the re- gimes coopted or harshly repressed dissidents and potential rivals. Sporadically, the regimes granted some degree of freedom and politi- cal rights as security valve to avert radical uprising and secure their survival.

Until recently, the Arab Mediterranean regimes seemed to maintain a significant level of political stability and to secure sufficient support for their regimes. Two non-exclusive arguments seem plausible to explain the historical shift. First, the authoritarian regimes violated the terms of the old bargain and did not offer any credible and viable alternative.

The regimes shifted gradually their core social base from the masses of workers, peasants and civil servants to a minority of influential urban rent-seeking bourgeoisie and rural landed elite and built new networks of patronage through privatization and other private sector related policies. Rapid demographic growth and massive flows of educated jobless imposed severe dilemmas for the regimes.

Although, they managed to achieve some economic growth, inequality and exclusion have been on the rise. An oil-producer country such as Algeria has been able, so far, to inject large amount of public money in the form of transfers and wage increases to maintain the regime alive.

Morocco, with much limited financial resources, had instead made political con- cessions by reforming its constitution. In Egypt and Tunisia, the rulers attempted a combination of repression, economic benefits and politi- cal concessions. However, both countries failed to weather the storm and their authoritarian regimes collapsed.

Second, the authoritarian model is no longer valid because the majority of people no longer accept the terms of the bargain. Over the last decades during which the authoritarian regimes have been ruling, fundamental changes occurred in the Arab Mediterranean societies. Their populations became larger, younger, more educated and urbanized.

Unlike their parents, the new generations, which account for almost two thirds of the total population; challenge the legitimacy of their rulers and point more comfortably to their failures3. Political rights and economic gains can no longer be substitutes as the old authoritarian bargain stipulated. First, the magnitude of inequality went up dramatically over the last years as did economic exclusion and social frustration.

This classification is based on five criteria: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The authoritarian regimes lack popular legitimacy5 and are not subjected to any checks and balances.

Those regimes, instead, combine coercive and incentive-based policies and share state resour- ces between repressing opponents and rewarding supporters. To survive in power, they establish their authority on the basis of security apparatuses and a system of competition for public patronage they can arbitrate. Provisions of Economic Benefits Despite some differences among the countries, overall Arab Medi- terranean regimes behaved in line with the authoritarian bargain mod- el during the past four to five decades.

Most Arab Mediterranean countries set up land reform policy, which broke up the vast holdings of the feudal landlords and distributed some of the expropriated land to landless and small farmers. Nasser's regime in Egypt and Baath regime in Syria, for instance, enjoyed strong legitimacy due to land reforms. The Nasser regime issued the first land reform law in Septemberwhich placed a feddans ceiling on land ownership6. The failure of authoritarianism in the Arab world from 35 percent to 57 percent7.

The government reduced the ceiling to feddans in ; then to 50 feddans per person and feddans per family in In Syria, after the takeover by Ba'ath Party, the government enforced radical provisions against landowners in the decree law of March It restricted individual ownership to between 15 and 45 hectares of irrigated land and 80 to hectares of rainfed land depending on the area.

From early sixties to mid seventies, the government in Syria distributed Land reform program in Syria led to a sharp decline in land concentration due to ownership ceiling stipulated by law Keilany The government was able to broaden its social base in the countryside and secure support by the segment of the peasants at the expense of landlords.

The implementation of land reforms allowed the rulers to weaken the landed elites and form a strong social basis for their regimes. It was a pivotal policy of the regimes in their attempt to consolidate their power and win the allegiance of poor rural communities.

The literature indicates that heavy land redistribution tends to occur more often in autocratic regimes and those that engage in more redistri- bution early in their tenures were likely to remain longer in power8. The regimes promoted landless and small farmers through land expropriation and redistribution.

Insecure property rights and state supervision of agricultural activity led to lasting contract of patronage and clientelism between the authoritarian rulers and the rural smallholders. First, property rights granted by the state to beneficiaries were most often incomplete. The evidence shows that by granting incomplete property rights, the political regime can secure future control over land recipients and their descendants9.

Second, farmers through their membership in state-run cooperatives had to rely on state policy for credit, input subsidies, warehousing and transport, marketing and out- put administered prices. When under fiscal constraints and changing policy trade-offs the state cut the delivery of these complementary services, or shifted its policy towards large farmers; most small farmers encountered dif- ficulties and often fell into poverty and marginalization.

To deliver benefits and secure loyalty to the authoritarian rulers of the educated elite and urban dwellers, the regimes created a large bureaucracy. Nationalization of economic assets, use of central plan- ning and adoption of explicit or implicit job guarantees led to substantial expansion of public sector employment. In most countries, the size of the public sector increased to exceptionally high level, compared to international averages, during the seventies and the eighties.

Public sector guaranteed lifetime employment with generous wages and other non wage benefits. Some countries in the region guaranteed civil service employment for graduates of secondary and higher education; others operated as employers of last resort Till the mid s, employment in the public sector represented, on average, more than one third of total employment in the Arab Mediterranean countries 20 percent in the government sector and Public jobs were one of the most important tools for the regime to extend favors and exert its political and social control.

The provision of free education and health services and heavily subsidized basic goods was another key component of the authoritarian economic and social bargain in the region.

According to IMFsubsidies cover about 40 percent of total domestic production costs for wheat products in Tunisia and approximately two thirds in Egypt. About half the sugar consumption in Egypt and Jordan and bread flour consumption in Morocco is subsidized, while almost all rice and powdered milk consumption in Jordan was subsidized in the early s.

Politics of Fear and Repression The provision of subsidies, social benefits and public sector employment can only partly explain the resilience of the authoritarian regimes in the region. In combination with economic bene- fits, the authoritarian rulers developed three repressive strategies to deter potential dissidents, contain their influence and punish them; using exceptional procedures and legal provisions stipulated in emer- gency and anti-terrorism laws and regulations.

First, authoritarian rulers developed emotionally powerful rhetoric to control society and justify repression. The Arab nationalist rhetoric, predominant in the sixties and seventies, enjoyed considerable popular appeal and led to the imposition of a single party system in most countries It helped the authoritarian regimes in the region to mobilize the masses, buttress their legitimacy and consolidate their power.

The late sixties represented a dramatic turn, however. After the naksa12, the rulers shifted to pragmatism and narrow national interests. The political discourse emphasized the priority of national security, unity and sovereignty against foreign conspiracy over any other political, economic or social issues. Second, the authoritarian rulers implemented legal means of repres- sion through Emergency Laws that restrict individual freedom and allow use of unchecked power by the state.

In Egypt, more than 1, civilian defendants were tried in military courts between and under the emergency law. This resulted in 92 death sentences and life imprisonment Human rights organizations estimated the number of Islamists and other political prisoners who were detained under emergency law in Egypt ranged between 13, and 20, by end of In Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, anti-terrorism laws empowered the security forces through exceptional provisions and resulted in recurrent human right violations and serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms15 Third, in many cases the authoritarian regimes in the region resorted to massive and disproportionate use of regime alimentaire pour le bodybuilding and violence against bread riots and peaceful protesters, mass arbitrary arrests, cruel torture and widespread intimidation Unsustainable Bargain Under the authoritarian bargain, countries in the region manage in the sixties and part of the seventies to achieve relatively high economic growth and improve their human capital indicators due to 13 KassemEgyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule 14 U.

The countries enjoyed large financial flows that allowed them to finance such policies. Egypt, Syria and Tunisia were small producers by international standards but had significant oil resources. Oil accounted for a large share of their ex- ports and government revenues. Morocco and Jordan were major producers of phosphates, the price of which increased five-fold after During the s much of this pattern was reversed.

The decline in government revenues due to the collapse of oil and phosphate pro- ceeds; the decline in migrant remittances and aid from the Gulf States imposed severe restrictions on their budgets. The prevailing social bargain became unsustainable. The economic reforms implemented hurt large segments of the population in the Arab Mediterranean countries, without offering real political opening through which grievances might be expressed Under adjustment programs of the eighties and nineties, the terms of the bargain were dramatically affected.

The liberal policies slashed or phased out most of the benefits, reversed land reforms by promoting land concentration, and pushed a large number of small and medium- sized farmers into poverty. But by the late eighties, the public sector was overstaffed and inefficient, and its wage bills represented a huge burden for the state budget. It accounted for 55 percent of the government current reve- nues in Morocco, 52 percent in Algeria, In addition to job stability and other non-wage benefits, public sector jobs offered relatively higher wages compared to those prevailing in the private sector The state reacted by reducing the number of new positions offered in the public sector.

The contribution of the public sector to total job creation dramatically declined in the late eighties and early nineties in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan. The impact was felt mostly by educated jobseekers particularly female educated who usually perceived civil service as a natural and guaranteed option after they complete their degrees. Free education and increased access to secondary and tertiary education made things worse.

Unemployment rates among educated youth surged to more than 20 percent up from negligible levels. As a result, authoritarian regimes in the region lost one key avenue through which they used to acquire their legitimacy and exert their control. In order to limit the burden of the wage bill on state budget, public sector wages were kept frozen or occasionally raised but not enough to offset for eroding effect of price liberalization and inflation.

The purchasing power of civil service wages declined sharply in countries such as in Tunisia and Egypt. In the latter, the average wage in the government sector lost 60 percent of its value during the nineties. The process of wage erosion persisted in the years at a faster rate in the public administration compared to other economic sectors. Reduc- tions in food and other subsidies resulted in riots, but they were reversed at times to preserve social peace and political stability.

Increasingly however, the authoritarian regimes started to lose their legitimacy within their traditional supporters, mainly landless and small-sized farmers, public sector employees and poor and middle- class households.

Over the past decade, Arab Mediterranean countries have seen an increase in strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of social protests motivated by economic and social grievances The anger soin maison cheveux anti pelliculaire frustration swept across the poor in the countryside, educa- ted jobless, marginalized street vendors and impoverished civil servants. The stability of the regimes was not, however, called into question.

The authoritarian rulers were able to come up with a number of strategies to preserve their power and renew some of their eroded legitimacy. Alternative survival strategies To preserve the regimes and strengthen their resilience, three strat- egies were developed. The failure of authoritarianism in the Arab world base to a minority of influential business elite and built new networks of patronage through privatization and other private sector related in- centives. Second, the regimes granted some limited degree of freedom and political rights as security valve to avert radical uprising.

Third, the regimes seized the opportunity of escalating international terrorism in the early s to secure support from the West and establish them- selves as vital partners in the international war against terror.

At the same time, they consolidated their police and security forces to crack- down on protesters and dissidents when necessary. Create Networks of patronage The authoritarian regimes used the opportunity of privatization policy to create a form of crony capitalism in which businessmen are heavily dependent on the state for access to power and favors.

By doing so the regimes goal was twofold. First, create a new social coalition for the regime as a counterweight to the traditional suppor- ters hit by market reforms, cuts in subsidies and other social benefits. Second, preserve the control of the economy and avoid any potential challenge that may emerge from an independent business community.

As a result, the regimes were able to create a loyal elite of entre- preneurs made of private sector capitalists, landed elites, the military officer corps and top state officials All of them secured windfall profits by purchasing the privatized assets sold at nominal prices. Many cases of undervaluation or underpricing of public enterprises privatized were reported.

Privatization turned out to be an extension to the power of the state and its entrenchment in a new socioeconomic model. The regimes also used costly incentive schemes, tolerance to tax fraud, and easy access to finance and public procurement as tools to control and discipline the private sector.

In Tunisia, for instance, the government gave up every year between 50 and 60 percent of due corporate taxes in the form of tax incentives during Implement façade political reforms The authoritarian rule in the region was both persistent and dynamic In addition to provision of economic gains and use of different repressive strategies, the resilience of the authoritarian regime in the region was also due to its ability to introduce marginal political reforms to manage internal or external pressures for democracy.

Despite their imperfections, the shift to multiparty system and the regular organization of elections conferred the authoritarian regimes in the region some façade legitimacy. Most countries drayton manor baby rides the region started to hold regular legislative elections since in Egypt and since in Tunisia and since in Algeria and allowed for some degree of pluralism.

Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria introduced nominal competitive presidential elections in the mids. By doing so, the regimes succeeded to avert undesirable electoral outcomes and subverted political openness Instead of weakening the incumbent regimes, these timid reforms produced new authoritarian systems that integrated liberal economic policies, new ruling alliances, some superficial pluralism and electoral legitimization tactics Unlike a genuine process of democratization, the top-down and shallow political reforms of the last two decades in the region did not lead to the redistribution of power and slipped into reverse in some cases.

However, as most of the independents later joined the NDP bloc, the ruling party enjoyed a solid 87 percent majority in the assembly. See for details, Dunne and Hamzawy in Marina and Choucair. The Bush administration accused authoritarianism as being responsible for the expansion of terrorism and made the commitment to promote democracy in the region. Following various electoral experiences in the region between andthe US realized that democratization will likely lead to Islamist domination of Arab poli- tics.

The risk is that Islamist governments would be much less willing to cooperate with the United States than are the current authoritarian rulers The authoritarian regimes seized this unexpected opportunity to renew their discourse and establish themselves as vital partners in the international war against terror. As a result, the West tolerated human right violations and manipulation of elections and preferred to support authoritarianism in the region and preserve its interests instead of promoting a risky democratization process.

Factors that speeded the authoritarian collapse During the past six years, economies of the region expanded, at relatively higher economic growth rates compared to the nineties; and most of them seemed to have had curbed the impact of the international economic crisis.

Three factors, at the heart of the massive uprising in both countries, have however affected the resilience of the authoritarian bargain model in the region and led, so far, to its collapse in Tunisia and Egypt. First, the fruits of economic growth were very unequally shared among the different social groups.

Regime agevolato riscatto laurea

The magnitude of inequality went up as did economic exclusion and social frustration. Second, endemic corruption proliferated beyond redemption in the 27 According to Gregory Gauseno one can predict the course a new democracy will take, but based on public opinion surveys and recent elections in the Arab world, the de- mocracy seems likely to produce new. Rising inequality Household surveys, on the basis of which inequality indicators are computed, focus exclusively on income or consumption inequality.

Bibi and Nabli emphasized that in comparison with the rest of the world, income inequality in the Arab region has remained mode- rately high with GINI coefficients lower than Latin America and Sub- Saharan Africa, comparable to those of East Asia but higher than those of Europe, Central and South Asia.

Bibi and Nabli argued that there is an overall decline in income inequality in the Arab world. This finding, however, dissimulates diverging trends among countries as shown in the table. For methodological reasons, household surveys underestimate the true level of inequality because of extremely limited information on the richest individuals and the degree of underestimation can differ from one country to the other rendering international comparisons meaningless.

For instance, inequality in earnings appears to be rela- tively higher in Arab Countries compared to other regions, and the distribution of other non-income indicators such as education, health, and land ownership reveal that the Arab countries are among the most unequal worldwide Wealth inequality might be more relevant in such circumstances, but figures are usually not available.

Beyond statistics, public perception of inequality and the feelings of injustice it generates can be much more meaningful. Liberal economic policies and the shift in the social base of the authoritarian regimes translated into rising inequality, and extreme forms of social and regional exclusions.

The poor and middle class who invested in the education of their children reaped frustration and unmet dreams and expectations. The prevalence of nepotism makes the issue even worse. Unlike youth from richer backgrounds who rely on dense networks, those from unprivileged families usually end up unemployed or stuck in bad jobs.

Over the last few years, sharp swings in international prices led to a double digit inflation on basic products in most countries in the region. As the rich spend only a small share of their income on food, these upsurges in hit the poor harder and their sense of inequality and injustice has grown further.

A recent IMF study reveals that food prices increases the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict However, the escalation of high profile corruption, abuse of position and embezzlement of public money by friends, allies and clients of the regimes made people distrustful and angry. They now recognize that corruption and poor governance has been the significant cause of the failure.

Their frustration with scandalous corruption cases was one key grievance expressed in their protests. Corruption infringes the funda- mental human rights to fair treatment, unbiased decision-making, and secure civil and political status.

Role of social media The use of mobile phones, access to satellite TV channels, Internet and other social media technologies increased tremendously in the region during the past decade. These modern communication technologies allowed ordinary people to overcome censorship imposed in state- controlled media.

People in the region become aware of how badly things have gone wrong, and conscious of the differences between their world and the rest in terms of standard of living, achievement, and, more generally, human and cultural development.

Digital activism, through dedicated blogs, two phase regimes Facebook pages replaced traditional forms of activism. In Egypt, guide anti cellulite ebook kindle instance, less than 5 percent of young people belong to political parties The social media enabled people to built trust and share awareness on the major economic and social issues.

Information and Commu- nication Technologies facilitate mobilization on the ground by connecting like-minded citizens, offering non-official information to anybody interested and inviting protesters to gather in public places, marches or other forms of political activism The authoritarian bargain proved to be unsustainable.

The transition from authoritarianism, either orderly or through mass pro- tests and toppling of the incumbent rulers, should lead to more inclusive political system with space, in the decision-making process, to political diversity and civil society participation labor union, private sector organizations, and youth organizations. The end of the authoritarian bargain requires a clear shift from patronage-based legitimacy to rational legitimacy built on constitu- tional means, and performance-based economic and development agencies.

But the political openness is not the ultimate objective, it should be reflected in economic and social policies and its effects trickle down to middle and poor segments of the population. References Abou-Mandour, Mohamad. Center for Agricultural Economic Studies. April Albertus, Michael, and Victor A. Amnesty International. Public Statement Document Se- ries. November Arezki, Rabah and Markus Brukner.

Arieff, Alexis. Congressional Research Service. January Desai, Raj M. Economics and Politics. El-Ghonemy, Mohamad Riad. London: Routeledge Friedman, Thomas. The New York Times. August 2, Gause, Gregory. Global Financial Integrity. Hamzawy, Amr and Marina Ottaway. June Janvry, Alain de, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. Kassem, Maye. London: Lynne Rienner King, Stephen Juan.

The new authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press Lewis, Bernard. Foreign Affairs. Osman, Tarek. Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak. New Haven: Yale University Press Ottaway, Marina, and Julia Choucair-Vizoso. Beyond the façade: Po- litical reforms in the Arab World. Pissarides, Chrisopher. Richards, Alan and John Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Mid- dle East 3rd ed. Westview Press Ritter, Daniel P.

European University Institute. May State Department. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Union Generale Tunisienne Du Travail. United Nations Development Program. International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth. Human Development Report: Egypt. United Nations. Human Rights Committee. March Report EGT. cremes anti rides jindabyne weather

Washington, DC World Bank. Secondo molti analisti questo fenomeno dipende da cause strutt- urali che potrebbero dar luogo, in un futuro ormai non lontano, a una crisi alimentare globale di ben maggiore portata e gravità rispetto a quella attualmente in atto.

In questo meccanismo complesso interagiscono inoltre fattori di breve e lungo periodo. La connessione fra i prezzi dei prodotti energetici e quelli agricoli ha svolto un ruolo importante. Indice dei prezzi dei prodotti alimentari. Gli effetti non si limitano ai beni direttamente utilizzati per la produzione energetica ma si estendono anche ad altri beni agricoli come il grano, perché una quota crescente di terra coltivabile viene sottratta alla sua produzione per essere destinata a quella del mais.

Inoltre, secondo le stime della F. Gli effetti della speculazione sui prezzi si aggiungono a quelli generati dai fattori menzionati amplificandoli. In concomitanza con la crisi finanziaria globale e lo scoppio delle bolle speculative nelle borse e sui mercati immobiliari, gli investitori hanno cercato di diversificare i propri portafogli orientandosi verso i mercati delle commodities.

Benché sia difficile affermare che la speculazione sia la causa princi- pale della dinamica dei prezzi, essa ha svolto comunque un ruolo rilevante, soprattutto per quanto riguarda la loro volatilità. Ultima e, forse, più importante come causa di variazioni repentine è il clima.

Il fattore climatico ha sempre condizionato il mercato agricolo ma, negli ultimi anni, il mutamento globale del clima sta divenendo sempre più una tendenza strutturale di lungo periodo che lascia presagire nuove e più gravi crisi alimentari nel futuro.

Nessuna di queste cause è, di per sé, in grado di determinare impennate improvvise dei prezzi ma, quando agiscono simulta- neamente interagendo fra loro, il risultato è una sorta di tempesta perfetta dagli effetti imprevedibili. I fattori di lungo periodo causano faire un pain regime progressiva riduzione degli stock accumulati di beni agricoli.

La connessione fra shock economici e instabilità politica è stata ampiamente analizzata nella letteratura economica5. I risultati mostrano chiaramente che la connessione fra le due variabili è molto forte a livello globale. La figura 2, è molto indicativa a questo proposito. Nei pochi casi in cui non vi è piena corrispondenza Mauri- tania, India, Mozambico ecc. Questa teoria ha ricevuto supporto empirico dalle analisi di Bruckner e Ciccone e Burke e Leigh sul mutamento in senso democratico nei paesi africani.

La crisi alimentare e la primavera araba Figura 2. Indice dei prezzi alimentari ed episodi di instabilità politica. Perché tale risveglio si manifesti non è necessaria una situazione di profonda deprivazione materiale quanto, piuttosto, un gap rilevante fra i diritti effettivi e quelli percepiti come inalienabili nella coscienza sociale.

La dipendenza dalle importazioni alimentari della regione nord africana è la più alta nel mondo. Gli effetti della crescita dei prezzi agricoli internazionali su un determinato paese dipendono dal saldo fra venditori di beni alimentari, che ne beneficiano, e acquirenti netti che ne subiscono le conseguenze negative.

Un valore più basso del rapporto è indice di minore sicurezza alimentare. Adresse e-mail ou mobile Mot de passe Informations de compte oubliées? Voir plus de contenu de Luigi Di Maio sur Facebook.

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